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If looks could kill, they probably will,
In games without frontiers – war without tears.
– Peter Gabriel
This article addresses the topic of war, which is not ordinarily considered germane to
academic studies of corporate law.
1  A few cases from the Vietnam era are sometimes included in
contemporary corporation casebooks.
2  But in an academic milieu dominated by considerations
and calculations of economic costs and benefits, mainstream corporate law teachers tend recently
to avoid thinking seriously about issues of business ethics and social responsibility.  Two of the
most prominent professors of corporate law, for example, have gone so far as to claim that “the
recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law among the business,
government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions” has resulted in a world in which
“[t]here is no serious competitor” to this view of the corporation.
3  “The triumph of the
shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors,” these two authors
conclude, “is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago.”
4 
They therefore declare “the end of history in corporate law” and predict that “the ideological and
competitive attractions of the standard model will become indisputable” with “convergence in
most aspects of the law and practice of corporate governance . . . sure to follow.”
5
                                                
1  Cf. Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467 (1960).
2  E.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971) (refusing a shareholder’s
right to corporate records regarding weapons and munitions manufacture when request is made for a political
purpose, namely, opposing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated and dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (addressing SEC’s decision on
allowing Dow Chemical Company’s refusal to submit a shareholder proposal on the use of napalm “on or against
human beings” on grounds of a securities regulation exception for “ordinary business” matters).
3  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001).
4  Id. at 468.
5  Id. at 439, 468.  The unspoken reference is to the controversial claim in social theory more generally of
“an end of history” after the Cold War.  See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993);
HOWARD WILLIAMS ET AL., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY (1999).  Other leading academics in
corporate law agree that a convergence in corporate governance regimes is likely to occur globally, but disagree
about the form of this convergence.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for GlobalWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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This triumphalist view of shareholders über alles in business corporations should be one
of the first casualties of a serious consideration of the nature of war in our modern, increasingly
global society.
6  On the contrary, the modern nature of war so forcefully brought home in the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, as well as the ensuing Allied military
action in Afghanistan, should remind scholars in business schools, law schools, and elsewhere
that corporations do not exist separately from the problems of human society.  We must consider
the role that business corporations play in the great games of international war and peace, as well
as less deadly economic competition.
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I considers the nature of war, with an emphasis on
the effects of globalization and the changing importance of national boundaries.  It reviews some
leading theories of war and how they relate to the business corporation.  In particular, it focuses
on the fast, recent growth of large multinational corporations and their ascent to economic and
                                                                                                                                                            
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 650-53 (1999) (arguing against
“formal convergence,” but predicting “functional convergence” through securities regulation); Ronald J. Gilson,
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 333-34  (2001)
(arguing against Hansmann and Kraakman’s thesis of “formal convergence,” but identifying other trends toward
“functional,” “contractual,” or “hybrid” convergence that may achieve similar results).  For a more direct challenge
to Hansmann and Kraakman’s end-of-history-in-corporate-law thesis, see Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain
Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (2001) (arguing that this
view is “chauvinistic,” “Americanocentric,” and supported largely only by “bald assertions”).
6  Not all commentators share the reductionist “shareholders only” model of the firm.  See, e.g., Mark J.
Roe, Rents and their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468, 1480 (2001) (observing that “players
inside the firm – shareholders, managers, employees – compet[e] to get a piece” of the economic action and noting
the existence at least in some countries of an “anti-shareholder-value ideology”); Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders
as Grown-Ups:  Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to “Just Say No,”  67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1005-
06 (1999) (noting that “shareholder wealth maximization remains at the center of the purpose and objective of the
corporation,” but recognizing competing theories and arguing for “more precise articulation” of the meaning of
“shareholder primacy” in different situations).  In previous work, I have argued for a view of the business firm that
includes owners (both of equity and credit), managers, and others with legal authority, including employees.  Eric W.
Orts, Shirking and Sharking:  A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 298-314 (1998).  I have
also argued for theories of corporate law that include considerations beyond those of shareholders, including other
constituent groups and ethical considerations.  See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923 (1984).  For a typology of different theories of “social and economic
organization” that remains relevant to competing theories of corporate law, see Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and
Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 925-50 (1984).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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political power to rival many nation-states in comparative size and relative influence.  Economic
globalization and the multinational corporations that support it have significant implications for
theories of modern war.
Part II turns to reconsider the perennially important topic of the nature and purposes of
the business corporation in the context of modern war.  It reviews the standard understanding of
corporate governance involving not only economic obligations, but also legal constraints and
ethical considerations.  Accepted restatements of the fundamental principles of corporate law are
not, as some academic commentators might prefer, encomia to the single-minded pursuit of
economic values.  Instead, they recognize the importance of law and ethics as components to the
development of corporate purposes.  In this context, the legal and ethical obligations of business
corporations with respect to issues of war and peace are considered.
Part III draws some conclusions from this consideration of the nature of war and business
corporations.  Briefly, it argues that a serious consideration of the moral and political importance
of issues of war and peace in modern society requires a major qualification to the standard law-
and-economics, shareholders-only view of the corporation.  An understanding the important
interconnections between modern war and the business corporation reveals that theories of the
social nature and purposes of business corporations have not yet reached an historical end.
To expand on Peter Gabriel’s lyrics quoted at the outset, economic globalization has
meant that businesses increasingly play in “games without frontiers.”
7  Enhanced technological
capabilities, as well as a hardening of hearts arguably made possible by evolution of modern
                                                
7  As Joseph White has pointed out, the metaphor of the “game” is very commonly used in business settings.
 B. Joseph White, Remarks at Conference on Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable
Peace, University of Michigan Business School, Nov. 3, 2001.  War is also often conceived in terms of game
theories and studied through war games.  See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 203-07, 223 (2001 ed.) (1959) (describing war as one game among others played by statesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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forms of social organization, has also made possible “war without tears.”
8  This article argues
that human society should strive against the economic, moral, and political outcome of perpetual
global war, and building the institutions necessary for peace should include attention to the social
structure of modern business corporations.
I.  On the Nature of Modern War
One basic principle that has not changed is that “war not healthy for children and other
living things.”
9  A recent documentary estimates that two million children have been killed in
wars in the last ten years.
10  Tragically, as seen in Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere, the use of
children as soldiers is “more and more common.”
11  Surely, “the love of children – with their
need for attention and care – is a moral bond that should transcend every local and national
barrier.”
12  Leo Tolstoy’s view remains true today:  “War is not polite recreation but the vilest
thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war.  Our attitude towards the
fearful necessity of war ought to be stern and serious.”
13
Carl von Clausewitz probably remains the leading social theorist of war, at least since the
ancient Chinese writer, Sun Tzu, and the ubiquitous European political theorist, Machiavelli.
14 
                                                                                                                                                            
in international politics).
8  One might even argue that the history of military organization into armies, navies, and other disciplined
organizational forms is the story of divorcing moral sensibilities from warfare.  For an argument that Western
superiority on the battlefield lies precisely in its moral ability to inflict maximum destruction on enemies, see VICTOR
DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN POWER (2001).
9 This slogan was a ubiquitous anti-war protest in the 1960s.  See, e.g., George Packer, The Way We Live
Now:  Recapturing The Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, mag., sect. 6, at 15.
10 Wendy J. William, Listening to the Children of War, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 28, 2000, at S32 (reviewing
the HBO documentary, “Children in War”).
11  Herbert M. Howe, Global Order and the Privatization of Security, 22 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD
AFFAIRS 1, 1 (1998).
12  ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50 (2001).
13  LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE, pt. 10, ch. xxv, p. 725 (Constance Garnett trans.) [check and complete
cite].
14  See, e.g., SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Samuel B. Griffith trans. 1984);NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE ART
OF WAR (Ellis Farneworth trans. 2001).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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“War,” according Clausewitz, “is an instrument of policy.”
15  It is, in fact, “policy itself, which
takes up the sword in place of the pen.”
16  For Clausewitz, writing in the early nineteenth century,
war is simply politics advanced by extreme means.  In his words, war is a “political instrument, a
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”
17 
Presciently, Clausewitz described war as a kind of “business competition, which is also a
conflict of human interests and activities,” or “still more like State policy, which again, on its
part, may be looked upon as a kind of business competition on a great scale.”
18  Interestingly, the
classical theories of war advanced by Clausewitz, as well as Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, remain
popular today as they are applied in the field of business strategy.
19  In Clausewitz’s original
theory of war, however, private interests of business are properly subsumed under the larger
rubric of “the interests of the whole community” – though it is possible that “policy may take a
false direction” and “promote unfairly the ambitious ends” of “private interests” or “the vanity of
rulers.”
20
In this context, business corporations – to the extent that they were just beginning to
come into existence in the nineteenth century – might have been considered instruments of the
nation-states in which they were based.
21  In the time of Clausewitz, the size and influence of
                                                
15 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 410 (J.J. Graham trans., Anatole Rapoport ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1832).
16  Id.
17  Id. at 119.
18  Id. at 202-03.
19  See, e.g., CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER STRATEGIST (ed. with
commentary, Tiha von Ghyczy, Christopher Bassford &  Bolko von Oetinger) (2001); THE RUTHLESS LEADER:
THREE CLASSICS OF STRATEGY AND POWER (ed. Alistair MacAlpine 2000) (including Machiavelli’s The Prince and
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War). See also ANTONY JAY, MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI:  DISCOVERING A NEW SCIENCE
OF MANAGEMENT IN THE TIMELESS PRINCIPLES OF STATECRAFT (1994) (advancing a theory of business management
based on Machiavelli’s political theory); MARK R. MCNEILLY SUN TZU AND THE ART OF BUSINESS:  SIX STRATEGIC
PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGERS (adapting Sun Tzu’s theory to modern business strategy) (2000).
20 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note __, at 404.
21  For general historical accounts of the development of business enterprises, including corporations, see
STUART BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE (1990); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THEWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
6
business firms were for the most part negligible.  For macro-analytic purposes, business entities
could be subsumed under national interests.  For much of the twentieth century as well, this view
of the subordinate relationship of business corporations under nation-states that were seen to give
them existence, may have been sufficient, though even relatively early in the twentieth century
concerns began to arise about the possibility of corporate “war merchants” influencing national
politics in an belligerent direction.
22  Historical evidence also suggests that wars have sometimes
been fought for reasons for “a minority of financial and industrial interests” that may reap “great
profit” as a result, even though overall national interests are rarely advanced by aggressive war.
23
 In general terms, however, the problem of war in the days of Clausewitz, and perhaps through
most of the twentieth century, could be conceived adequately as a problem of “the state system”
international politics.
24
Today, however, business corporations can no longer be so easily compartmentalized, and
neither can the problem of modern war.  Increasingly, business corporations act internationally
and transnationally, citizens of the world rather than any particular nation-state.
25  In about thirty
years, from 1969 to 1990, the number of multinational firms more than tripled, from 7,000 to
                                                                                                                                                            
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
22  See, e.g., ANTHONY SAMPSON, ARMS BAZAAR: FROM LEBANON TO LOCKHEED (1977) (providing an
overview of the international arms trade). The fear of corporate influence on policy favoring war profits is still
palpable today.  See, e.g., http://www.moveon.org/warprofiteering/ (visited Oct. 31, 2001) (lobbying against
alternative corporate tax change on this ground).
23  WALTZ, supra note __, at 145 (citing John Hobson’s historical study of the Boer War, but criticizing the
thesis of “imperialism” as a general cause of war).  Some wars may well result when “certain well-organized business
interests are able to outweigh the weak, diffused interests” in a country, but such wars of “imperialism” are “an
expensive form of folly” for “the nation as a whole.”  Id. at 145-46 (citing and quoting Hobson).
24  WALTZ, supra note __, at ix.  However, some scholars have argued that capitalist state formation may
encourage war.  For a collection of anthropological essays along these lines, see DEADLY DEVELOPMENTS:
CAPITALISM, STATES AND WAR (S,P. Reyna &  R. E. Downs eds. 1999).
25  For an overview setting up the general problem, see Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational
Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 247-66 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995).  See also PHILIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE LAW (1993) (describing the difficulty that
globalization poses for traditional legal conceptions of the business corporation).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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24,000.
26  By 2000, the number of multinational firms had more than doubled again to 60,000,
with 800,000 foreign subsidiaries.
27  Multinational business now accounts for approximately
one-quarter of world economic output.
28  Sales of multinational-affiliated corporations are twice
the value of global exports of all good and services.
29  Although the number of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions fell by about 50 percent in 2001, especially after the events of
September 11, the  slowdown followed a three-year surge in international combinations, and the
trend toward global companies is likely to resume.
30  Two U.S.-based companies exemplify this
changing reality of global corporate governance.  General Electric today classifies more than 35
percent of its assets as foreign (up from only 13.5 percent in 1994), and IBM now has more than
half of its total assets located overseas.
31  The recent German-U.S. hybrid, DaimlerChrysler, also
illustrates this trend in its recent advertising campaign featuring a single flag sewing together the
smaller flags of each state and boasting that the company calls over 200 different countries
“home.”
32  As a result, the concept of global “corporate citizenship” has entered the business
lexicon, even if the contours of this idea are not yet clearly determined.
33 
Many large multinational corporations have indeed become much larger – in terms of
overall economic wealth and political influence – than many nation-states.  Although comparing
the economic size and political muscle of business corporations and nation-states is to compare
                                                
26  Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1963-64 (book review)
27  Stephen J. Kobrin, The End of Globalization? 6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing
United Nations statistics).
28  Id.
29  Id.  For additional empirical evidence of the “importance and recent acceleration of corporate
globalization,” see Michael Bradley, et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary
Society:  Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 14-21 (1999).
30  Joseph Quinlan, No Stopping the Global M&A Train, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 24.
31  Id.
32  http://www.daimlerchrysler.de/index_e.htm (visited Nov. 14, 2001).
33  For recent treatments in the business literature, see CORPORATE GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP:  DOING BUSINESS
IN THE PUBLIC EYE (Noel M. Tichy et al. ed., 1998); MALCOLM MCINTOSH, ET AL., CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP:William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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apples with oranges, one can nevertheless say with assurance that the relative size and influence
of business corporations has increased dramatically in recent years compared with nation-states. 
According to one recent study that makes the comparison, fifty-one of the one hundred largest
integrated economic entities in the world today are business corporations; the remaining forty-
nine entities are nation-states.
34  More than twenty years ago, another observer argued that “the
largest corporations overshadow all save about a dozen of the nation-states of the planet” in
terms of “totality of assets.”
35  In terms of raw measurements of economic size and power, large
corporations dwarf many smaller nation-states.
36  As a result, “significant decisions affecting
people everywhere” are increasingly “made by corporate managers, not political officers.”
37  A
large “void” with respect to business corporations has therefore opened “at the intersection of
national boundaries that is very difficult to manage and control.”
38
Descriptively, then, we may criticize Clausewitz’s view of the world as too simple and
old-fashioned.  What Jürgen Habermas calls a “new postnational constellation” has arisen – the
creation of economic, political, and cultural forces of globalization.
39  Here, globalization means
“a process” that “characterizes the increasing scope and intensity of commercial, communicative,
and exchange relations beyond national borders.”
40  Expanding networks of “satellite technology,
                                                                                                                                                            
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES (1998).
34  NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DEATH OF
DEMOCRACY __ (2002) [forthcoming].  See also John Kay, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001 (available at
http://www.johnkay.com/articles/) (reviewing Hertz’s claim).
35 ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 223 (1976). 
36 [add cite and example].
37 Id.
38  Bradley, et al., supra note __, at 31.
39  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 60-61.  See also
MARTIN L. VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE 336-421(1999) (describing the “decline of the
state” in recent years and the need to confront a new political reality “beyond the state”).
40  HABERMAS, supra note __, at 65-66.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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air travel, and digital communications” characterize this process.
41  One might even say that the 
“process” of globalization has reached the status of “a condition – a globality, a world economy
in which the traditional and familiar boundaries are being surmounted or made irrelevant.”
42  As
described by Selya Benhabib, “global integration in the sphere of economics, armament, finance,
communication, information, and tourism [has] proceeded with a dizzying pace.”
43  New risks
come with this process of globalization, including not only the advent of new and potent brands
of international terrorism, but also global ecological challenges, global financial risks, and other
collective action problems for social organization.
44
Mark Duffield describes these emerging patterns as “paradoxes of globalization.”
45  The
“changing competence of the nation-state,” according to Duffield, results in “a shift” from a
reliance on hierarchical national governments to “wider and more polyarchal networks, contracts
and partnerships of governance.”
46  Globalization raises problems of political accountability and
democratic legitimacy.
47  Considerations of economics becomes elevated over politics in many
areas.
48  In addition, globalization seems to occur in tandem with an increase in “cultural, ethnic,
linguistic, [and] religious separatisms and demands for local and regional autonomy.”
49
                                                
41  Id. at 66.
42  DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 14 (1998).  Little of substance
seems to turn on a distinction between globalization as a “process” or “condition.”
43  Selya Benhabib, Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World 5 (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (forthcoming in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE (Ira Katznelson &
Helen Milner eds., 2001)).
44  Id.  See also Ulrich Beck, Globalization’s Chernobyl, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at 15 (surveying the
global risks that the events of September 11 exposed).
45  Mark Duffield, Geography and the Boundaries of Confidence:  Globalization and War Economies:
Promoting Order or the Return of History? 23 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS J. 21 (1999).
46  Id. at 23.
47  Id.
48  Id.  For a description and analysis of the recent “shift” in emphasis from political states to economic
markets, see Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note __, at 11-17, 125-51, 369-91.
49  Benhabib, supra note __, at 5.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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Globalization thus transforms the nature of war.
50  According to Martin van Creveld, the
post-Westphalian period of the dominance nation-states and the paradigm of war as primarily
involving conflict among nation-states is now ending.
51  In van Creveld’s words,
The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the most important
and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is in decline.  From Western Europe to
Africa, many existing state are either combining into larger communities or falling apart. 
. . .  Globally speaking, the international system is moving away from an assembly of
distinct, territorial, sovereign, legally equal states toward different, more hierarchical, and
in many ways more complicated structures.  As far as individual states are concerned,
there are good reasons to think that many of them will soon no longer be either willing or
able to control and protect the political, military, economic, social, and cultural lives of
their citizens to the extent that they used to.  Needless to say, these developments affect
each and every individual now living on this planet.  In some places, these will proceed
peacefully, but in others they are likely to result in – indeed are already leading to –
upheavals as profound, and possible as bloody, as those that propelled humanity out of
the Middle Ages and into the modern world.
52
In a globalized society, simplified versions of Clausewitz no longer apply.  Instead, nation-states
are losing their grip on their monopolies of violence.  Global society may be returning to a world
characterized by complex struggles in which “political, social, economic, and religious motives”
become “hopelessly entangled.”
53  If so, then we may well expect the return to prominence of
“mercenaries” and “swarms of private armies” such as those that characterized the period of the
Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.
54
Perhaps the leading contemporary theorist of war, John Keegan, agrees with the premises
of this diagnosis.  According to Keegan, war has become too expensive for modern rich states to
                                                
50  For a leading recent treatment of this topic, see MARTIN L. VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WAR (1991).  See also ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY: SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD 43-49 (2000) (discussing van Creveld’s theory of war and its influence on the Pentagon’s thinking
about war in the twenty-first century).
51  See KAPLAN, supra note __, at 46 (describing van Creveld’s views).
52 VAN CREVELD, supra note __ [The Rise and Decline of the State], at vii.
53  KAPLAN, supra note __, at 46 (quoting van Creveld).
54  Id.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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wage against each other in its “full potentiality,” but it has also “become,  paradoxically, a cheap
and deadly undertaking for poor states, for enemies of the state idea, and for factions in states
falling apart.”
55  Rather than states, we therefore face new kinds of enemies.  “The rogue ruler,
the terrorist and the fundamentalist movement, the ethnic or religious faction,” Keegan writes,
“are all enemies as serious as any, in an age of junk weapons, as civilization has ever faced.”
56
In other words, new technologies and the political challenges of war in a modern, globalized
world have changed significantly.  Limited rather than unlimited war becomes the rule, rather
than the exception.
57  As General Wesley Clark writes, military actions in this “difficult region”
are “not quite war – not quite peace.”
58
At the same time that Keegan recognizes technological and political changes in the nature
of modern war, however, he criticizes Clausewitz’s traditional conception on normative grounds.
 Keegan sees Clausewitz as producing “the most pernicious philosophy” of war “yet conceived”
because it views war as “a value free activity, outside the moral sphere.”
59  The history of the
catastrophes of the “short” twentieth century and its two global wars provide graphic evidence
that Clausewitz was mistaken in thinking that the “rational” calculations of national interests by
states would limit warfare.
60
Important implications for a contemporary moral perspective on war follow from its new
                                                
55  JOHN KEEGAN, WAR AND OUR WORLD 68 (1998).
56  Id.
57  WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 418-19
(2001) (describing NATO’s intervention in Serbia and Kosovo as a “limited war” of a kind likely to be repeated in
the future).
58  Id. at 458.  In this middling region between unlimited war and international criminal police actions, Clark
includes “limited war, pre-and post-conflict operations, and ‘nation building’.”  Id.
59  Id. at 41-42.
60  For Keegan, Clausewitz’s theory therefore at least implicitly provided a justification for the totalitarian
state.  Id. at 42.  For an account of “the short twentieth century” as including the “catastrophe” of two world wars,
see HABERMAS, supra note __, at 37-57.  As Waltz argues, Rousseau had, prior to Clausewitz, made a convincing
theoretical case that nation-states acting in their own self-interests – even as aggregated in a “general will” – haveWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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globalized character.  War changes over time.
61  “Like a disease,” again according to Keegan, “it
exhibits the capacity to mutate, and mutates fastest in the fact of efforts to control or eliminate
it.”
62  Keegan defines war as “collective killing for some collective purpose.”
63  It retains a “a
scourge-like nature . . . to threaten the very survival of civilization itself.”
64
From the perspective of the business corporation, this account of the modern, globalized
nature of war suggests several important issues.  First, business corporations have increasingly
become “detached” from nation-states in their everyday operations.  The driving force of this
process of globalization is fundamentally economic rather than political.
65  “Nation-states do not
trade with one another,” as two commentators argued recently with some overstatement,
“enterprises do.”
66  Because business corporations are fundamental to the globalization process,
they are also key to understanding the changed nature of the disease of modern war and its
possible antidotes.
Second, the central role of business enterprises in globalization means that they cannot
avoid becoming implicated in global issues of war and peace.  If not to the same extent as the
nation-states that field great armies, business corporations often have occasion to ally with states
in using force and even hire military help independently of states.   Moreover, if nation-states
cannot protect businesses, then business people will seek other ways to protect themselves.  An
example may be found in contemporary Russia, where hiring a private security agency is counted
                                                                                                                                                            
inadequate incentives to maintain peace.   Waltz, supra note __, at 165-86 (critically discussing Rousseau’s theory).
61  See KEEGAN, supra note __, at 72 (“War is a protean activity, by which I mean it changes form, often
unpredictably . . . .).
62  Id.
63  Id.
64  Id. at 1.
65  See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
66  Michael A. Almond & Scott. D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and
Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. IN’TL L. & COMM. REG. 389, 402 (1997).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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as the normal course of doing business.
67  Indeed, the rise of private security companies in the
world at large is an immense growth industry, which seems to illustrate both a decline of the
protective powers of political states and an increase in business responses to social insecurity.
68
Third, the decline of the relative influence of nation-states means that the “new enemies”
of international society – including terrorists, as well as organized crime – may use corporate and
other business organizational forms for illicit ends.  A chilling recent example is the “corporate”
organization of the Al Qaeda terrorist network.
69  International channels and methods of business
may be employed for illicit political and economic purposes, and new organizational responses to
these threats are required.
Fourth, the nature of modern war highlights the fact that business corporations are not
only abstract economic entities but social institutions.  As organized institutions composed of
human beings, they have moral and political as well as economic responsibilities.  Like states,
business corporations must therefore develop their own foreign and domestic policies, either
implicitly and even unconsciously or, much better, explicitly and with awareness.  This does not
mean that large, global corporations need to appoint new vice presidents of war or defense; but it
does require corporate leaders to take the larger global issues of war and peace seriously from a
moral as well as an economic perspective.  In a “postnational” world, business corporations can
no longer simply rely on nation-states to take of problems of international security – if, indeed,
they ever could delegate this responsibility entirely.
                                                
67 [add cite]  See also infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing the rise of “private military
companies”).
68  For statistics on the exponential growth of the private security business in Europe and the United States,
see VAN CREVELD, supra note __ [The Rise and Decline of the State], at 404.
69  See Kurt Eichenwald, Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at __; William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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II. On the Nature and Purposes of Business Corporations
Milton Friedman has memorably expressed one common understanding of the nature and
purposes of the modern business corporation.  In general, according to Friedman, corporate
executives have the responsibility “to make as much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”
70 
Unpacking this approach into a more formal analytical framework, the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance states that (a) the “objective” of a corporation is “the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profits and shareholder gain”
and (b) legal and ethical considerations qualify this economic objective.
71  Specifically, there are
at least three qualifications.  First, “[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [i]s obliged, to the same extent as a
natural person, to act within the boundaries of the law.”
72  Second, a corporation “[m]ay take into
account ethical obligations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct
of business.”
73  And third, a corporation may “devote a reasonable amount of resources to public
                                                                                                                                                            
Dan Van Natta, Jr., Running Terrorism as a New Economy Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at __.
70  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1970, mag., at 32.
71  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994).  Although intended to be “consistent with case law,” Section 2.01 has “sparked
controversy” among commentators.  Bradley, et al., supra note __, at 48.  As my colleague, Alan Strudler,
emphasized in discussions with me, the ALI’s restatement of the corporate objective as “enhancing corporate profits
and shareholder gain” is not synonymous with Friedman’s injunction “to make the most money possible.”  The latter
seems to lead to an imperative of “shareholder value maximization,” while the softer verb “enhance” seems to allow
for non-maximizing value strategies (including profit “satisficing”) and perhaps even the addition of multiple
objectives, including what the ALI formally structures as exceptions to the economic objective, namely, socially
responsible objectives of following the law and acting ethically.  The ALI’s “enhancing corporate profits and
shareholder gain” language is probably best interpreted as a compromise between contending views of the business
corporation in society.  If correct, this interpretation would provide further evidence that “end of history” in
corporate law has not been reached.  Academic debates can and should continue about the proper place of corporate
governance within the larger society.  
72  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __, at § 2.01(b)(1).
73  Id. § 2.01(b)(2).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”
74  Modern war raises concerns
on all three levels related to the corporate objective:  economic, legal, and ethical.
75
A.  War and the Economic Objective
On the purely economic dimension, private corporations may seek to make profits and
enhance shareholder value by engaging in the business of war, that is, manufacturing and selling
weapons, munitions, and military services.  Recent activities in this industry give a sense of the
scale of this business.  On October 27, 2001, the U.S. Defense Department awarded the largest
military contract in American history to Lockheed Martin Corporation in the amount of $200
billion for the building of a new Joint Strike Fighter supersonic stealth jet.
76  Also in October
2001, the U.S. Justice Department blocked a proposed friendly acquisition of Newport News
Shipbuilding by General Dynamics valued at $2.6 billion on the grounds that the deal would
create a monopoly in the construction and sale of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers.
77  The government prefers a merger between Newport News and Northrup Grumman.
78 
News of the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon sent military
stocks upwards.
79  Similar, though perhaps smaller, connections between business corporations
and national military budgets apply to both companies and countries outside the United States.
80 
Clearly, there is much money still to be made in war, and today business corporations act as the
                                                
74  Id. § 2.01(b)(3).
75  Although my analysis in this part will draw primarily on U.S. examples, the general issues are relevant
also for law and business corporations in other countries with appropriate amendments.
76  Edward Alden, Lockheed Wins $200bn Pentagon Project, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27/28, 2001, at 1; James Dao
& Laura M. Holson, Lockheed Wins $200 Billion Deal for Fighter Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at A1.  The loser
was Boeing Corporation.  See also Alexander Nicoli, Aerospace Companies Scramble in Their Biggest Dogfight Yet,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at 8.
77  Edward Alden et al., Newport News Sale Is Blocked, Fin. Times, Oct. 24, 2001, at 21; Edward Alden,
Contractor Falls Found of New Dynamic in Defence Thinking, Oct. 25, 2001, at 20.
78  Id.
79  [add cites]
80 [add citations and perhaps some statistics]William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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primary vehicle for the purpose.
Special issues of law and ethics arise in military contracting.  Billion-dollar contracts
must create great temptations for corporate executives or other employees to fudge the rules on
political lobbying and fair economic competition.  The regulation of government procurement
contracts has therefore been traditionally very detailed.
81  In the United States, a large Defense
Contract Auditing Agency oversees defense procurement.
82  Companies themselves recognize the
special nature of the legal and ethical problems they face, and the defense industry in the United
States has organized a voluntary Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct.
83
Another important issue involves the regulation of financial contributions to political
campaigns.
84  Although it is not illegal for business corporations to contribute to the political
process, the question arises whether a military contractor should, as a matter of policy, have
significant influence in choosing political leaders.  At least arguably, the economic objective
should not allow corporations in the business of war to support candidates with particularly
aggressive foreign policy agendas.  But these issues slide into the topic of legal and ethical
constraints on the economic objective.  Before considering these important areas, however, I
would like to mention one troubling trend that raises the issue of whether business corporations
should sometimes be banned from engaging in at least some kinds of military profit-making. 
                                                
81  For a good overview of the regulation of the federal government procurement contracting process, with
criticism of Clinton Administration reforms, see Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight:  The Fundamental Failure
of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 627 (2001).
82  See http://www.dcaa.mil/ (visited October 29, 2001).
83  See http://www.dii.org/ (visited December 14, 2001).  The Defense Industry Initiative includes “a set of
six principles drafted by the representatives from eighteen defense contractors that called for specific compliance
procedures, policies, and programs, e.g., codes of ethics, ethics training, and internal reporting practices.”  William
S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1999).
84  For general treatments of the jurisprudence of regulation of corporate campaign contributions, which
involves First Amendment restrictions, see Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 587 (1991); Thomas J. Woo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating
Corporate Governance into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (2001).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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This trend relates to the recent increase in what have been called “private military companies”
(PMCs).
85
In June 1997, the Pentagon held a conference on the “privatization of security” in sub-
Saharan Africa.
86  Members of a new growth industry of PMCs were on display, as well as the
private security representatives of some large oil companies, such as Texaco and Exxon.
87  For
example, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) claims “the greatest corporate
assemblage of military expertise in the world,” including seventeen retired U.S. generals as well
as hundreds of former U.S. Special Forces personnel.
88  Vinnell Corporation is another example.
 It employs approximately 1,000 former U.S. military personnel in training 65,000 members of
the Saudi National Guard, the personal security contingent protecting the Saudi Royal family.
89  
Executive Outcomes (EO) is a South African company that fields thousands of combat soldiers
in sub-Saharan Africa.  EO’s air capabilities include a fleet of helicopters and MIG fighter jets.
90
The existence and use of PMCs raises a central question with respect to the economic
objective of corporate law.  Unlike informal or ad hoc networks of mercenary armies in the past,
PMCs today have developed a “distinct corporate nature,” including “a desire for good public
relations.”
91  But are corporate “soldiers of fortune” to be accepted as just another way of doing
business?  At least, the issue of the intrinsic legitimacy of these kinds of businesses arises.  A
                                                
85  Craig Forcese, Deterring “Militarized Commerce”:  The Prospect of Liability for "Privatized" Human
Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 171, 174 (1999/2000).  See also David Shearer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN
POL’Y, (Fall 1998) at 68 (describing the rise of private military companies).
86  Forcese, supra note __, at 174.
87  Id.  Not surprisingly, the private security business has been a growth industry in the post-September 11
world.  See Al Baker, Fear Feeds Bull Market in Private Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at D1.  A distinction
should be drawn, however, between private security firms operating within the legal framework of a national state
and firms with transnational scope and include military services. 
88  Howe, supra note __, at 2.
89  Id.  Vinnell is a subsidiary of TRW Corporation based in Fairfax, Virginia.  See http://www.vinnell.com/
(visited October 29, 2001).
90  Howe, supra note __, at 2.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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primary aspect of the claim to legitimacy by political states involves the assumed monopoly on
military force that they exercise.  Private military companies threaten to erode this monopoly of
coercive force.  The economic objective of maximizing shareholder value does not compare
favorably with theories of political democracy as a legitimate basis for the use of military force. 
A good argument can made, therefore, for an international agreement to ban PMCs, though the
social forces of globalization may make such an agreement difficult to achieve.  At the same
time, it is accurate to observe that the rise of PMCs responds to “the pullback of western nations
and the United Nations from peacekeeping and peace enforcing” missions, especially in poor or
developing countries.
92  At least, the international community should seek to regulate the actions
and behavior of PMCs, probably through an international treaty – in other words, through the
development of morally informed legal constraints.
93 Already in the United States, for example,
some regulation is provided under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration
Act.
94  The Arms Export Control Act provides conditions for the foreign sale of U.S. goods and
services, and the Export Administration Act regulates the export and sale of so-called “dual-use”
material that has both civilian and military applications.
95  Similar controls are imposed in other
countries.
96  International regulation of private companies engaged in the actual provision of
military services as “modern mercenaries,” however, is lacking, if not entirely absent.
B.  Legal Constraints on the Business of War
Contrary to what one might assume from a strict shareholders-only view of the business
corporation, the accepted general rule in the United States is that a corporation has an obligation
                                                                                                                                                            
91  Id.
92  Id. at 5.
93  Id. at 7.
94  Id.
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to follow the law, in the words of the American Law Institute, “to the same extent as a natural
person.”
97  The Reporters’ comments on this requirement make clear that “cost-benefit analysis,”
though it may have an appropriate role in government determinations about the adoption of legal
rules, should not apply to a corporation’s own decision whether or not to comply with the law. 
Because “the resulting legal rule normally represents a community decision that the conduct is
wrongful as such,” then “cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the rule is out of place.”
98
This requirement to follow the law even if it is not economically convenient to do so is
mandatory, in contrast to the permissively formulated ethical and philanthropic qualifications.
99 
The Principles of Corporate Law recognize, however, that the requirement to follow the law
finds its own justification in the “moral norm of obedience to law.”
100  The legitimacy of this
norm derives in turn from the democratic legitimacy of governments that enact the law.
101  As
Melvin Eisenberg, a Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles explains:  “Ours is a
society of law.  We don’t want a society in which the major players – that is, corporations – are
lawless.”
102
Several complications with what Eisenberg calls this “legal-conduct principle” arise in
practice.
103  First, in a globalized world, corporations will often find themselves subject to
                                                                                                                                                            
96 [add examples]
97  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __,  § 2.01(b)(1).
98  Id.  § 2.01(b)(1) cmt. g.
99  A commentator on early drafts of Section 2.01 made the point that it “consists of a mixture of mandates
and aspirations.”  Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI’s Principles, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 512, 513 (1984).  The obligation to the follow the law is expressed as a “mandate,” while the
ethical and philanthropic provisions are “permissive.”  Id.
100  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __,  § 2.01(b)(1), cmt. g.
101  The legitimacy of law is a large and complex jurisprudential topic.  For one of my attempts to grapple
with the issue, see Eric W. Orts, Systemic Legitimacy and Positive Law: A Comment on Hart and Habermas, 6
RATIO JURIS 245 (1993).
102  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 1, 3 (1998).
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inconsistent regulations.  One may say, as Lockheed Martin does in its Code of Ethics and
Business Conduct, that a corporation will “obey all the laws of the countries in which we do
business.”
104  But this promise does not account for hard choices that have to be made when laws
of different countries conflict.  In the case of a major government contractor like Lockheed
Martin, one assumes that loyalty to its “home country” of the United States outweighs conflicting
laws of other countries, but this choice requires a moral judgment.
105  It is not merely a technical
question of conflicts of laws.
Second, even with respect to following one set of national laws, complex regulations may
mean that it is practically impossible to comply with all regulations all of the time.  One example
comes from environmental law, where corporate compliance officers find keeping abreast of
changing regulations difficult and full compliance with them impossible.
106  The same difficulty
may arise in the complex legal environment of military contracting.  To take Lockheed Martin
again as an example, the corporation recognizes that “laws and regulations related to government
contracting are far-reaching and complex, thus placing responsibilities on Lockheed Martin
beyond those faced by companies without government customers,” but the company nevertheless
promises to “conduct our business in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.
107 
Complying with potentially conflicting regulations in different countries also complicates these
problems.   In Lockheed’s recently awarded contract for the Joint Strike Fighter, the company
                                                
104  http://www.lockheedmartin.com/exeth/html/code/print.html (visited October 29, 2001).
105  At the time of this writing, Lockheed Martin’s homepage included a link to a series of patriotic video
tributes as well as the announcement of a new Lockheed Martin American Spirit Fund to provide charitable
contributions for relief to New York, Washington, and other regions affected by the September 11 attacks.  See
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ (visited October 29, 2001).  The site leaves no doubt about the company’s national
loyalty.
106  See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 1227, 1240-41 & n.55 (1995)
(surveys show most participants do not believe that full compliance with all environmental laws was even possible).
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will have to comply with both U.S. and U.K. laws.
108
Third, the question of obeying the law “to the same extent as a natural person” raises the
question of the scope of the comparative standard.  If most “natural persons”disobey the law –
speed limits on highways, for example – then may corporate decision makers follow the same
strategy?
109  Many examples in this category are trivial, but “natural persons” certainly often take
risks in not following the law, accepting the risks that if they get caught, they will pay the fine or
penalty.  Arguably at least, business corporations should enjoy a similar freedom of action.
110
Lastly, the moral obligation to obey the law does not always trump other more basic
moral obligations.  The topic of potential conflicts between the obligations of law and morality is
a very large one.
111  Suffice it to say here that a corporation engaged in the business of war may
sometimes face serious moral considerations that require abstention from following a law or even
affirmative civil disobedience of an unjust law or a tyrannical government.  To take one example,
corporations doing business within Nazi Germany cannot claim simply to have been “following
the law” to justify war profits.
112  Similarly, corporations today must make judgments about the
                                                
108   See supra note __ and accompanying text.
109  For a hypothetical along these lines involving setting corporate policy to comply (or violate) different
state limits for the weight of trucks traveling on highways, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
349-50 (2000).     
110  On the other hand, one can argue that corporate policies to disobey the law – even for a presumably
trivial reason like speeding or parking tickets – should be treated more severely because of the organizational and
deliberate nature of a decision about policy, rather than seat-of-the-pants decisions by natural persons to comply with
traffic laws (or not).
111  For useful overviews of the basic issues, see KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
(1987); THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (William A. Edmundson ed. 1999).
112  Claims against firm that employed slave labor during the Nazi regime include not only prominent
German corporations such as Bayer, BMW, Krupp, Siemens, and Volkswagen, but also American firms with
German subsidiaries such as Ford, General Motors, Exxon-Mobil, and Kodak.  See Kara C. Ryf, Note,
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG: U.S. Courts Allow Siemens and Degussa to Profit from Holocaust Slave Labor,  33
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 156-58 (2001).  See also John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights:
Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT L. 463, 469 (2000) (noting that Bayer
has admitted to using slave labor during the Nazi period, while BMW, Volkswagen, and Siemens have been accused
of similar behavior); Stuart M. Kreindler, Comment, History's Accounting: Liability Issues Surrounding German
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morality of doing business with various nation-states and other actors for different purposes.
113 
Following the law is not a sufficient reason to act immorally, and this principle applies even
more strongly to fundamental problems of war and peace than other circumstances where the
stakes for human beings and their fundamental rights may be smaller.
Moral obligations to avoid complicity in unjust wars may also lead to changing legal
standards for liability.  Thus, for example, the extension of liability under the Alien Tort Claims
Act
114 and Torture Victim Prevention Act
115 may reflect a general movement toward increasing
international enforcement of basic human rights.
116  Cases have begun to recognize causes of
action for the breach of internationally recognized human rights (jus cogens) in the United States
and elsewhere.
117  For example, the leading case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
118 held  “deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority” to be actionable under the Alien Tort Claims
                                                                                                                                                            
the circumstances of various lawsuits filed against German companies in the United States); Kevin M. McDonald,
Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for Violations of Customary International Law
During the Third Reich,1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167 (2000) [add parenthetical].  In one
recent case, a court sustained a cause of action brought for Nazi-era crimes against a Germany subsidiary of Ford. 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
In the Nuremberg Trials, a showing of “necessity” under compulsion or duress was allowed as a defense for some
individual defendants who were businesspeople found to have employed slave labor to further the economic interests
of the Nazi regime.  But this defense was not permitted to defendants who had “embraced the opportunity” or
expressed an “ardent desire” to employ slave labor.  See Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1309-1310 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (discussing three Nuremberg cases).
113  One interesting development has been the increasing tendency of political subdivisions of the nation-
states – such as the “states” of the United States – to assert political restrictions on business operations.  For
examples and an overview of the constitutional issues involved, see Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism:
State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1129-47 (2000).
114 28 U.S.C. § 1350  [check cite].
115 28 U.S.C.§ 1350 [check cite].
116  See DRINAN, supra note __, at 95-103; Anderson, supra note __, at 491-96.  See also Kathryn L. Boyd,
Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level,1999 B.Y.U.L. REV.
1139 (arguing for use of class actions to enforce human rights violations by corporations abroad).
117   For a discussion of the general problem, see Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating Jus Cogens, 13 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 145 (1994).   But see Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action,1 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 421 (2000) (arguing that a “second wave” of post-Filartiga private human rights actions based on
customary international law have largely failed with respect to U.S. defendants).  For a critique of the development
of universal legal principles such as jus cogens, see Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens, and Offenses
Erga Omnes? 35 NEW ENG.L. REV. 265 (2001).
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Act as a violation of “universally accepted norms of international law of human rights.”
119  More
recently, in Kadic v. Karadzic,
120 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a claim against a
private citizen under the Alien Tort Claims Act for a violation of international legal prohibitions
against war crimes and genocide.
121  Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian-Serb, had been served process
when he visited the United Nations in New York.
122  He was accused of genocide, war crimes,
and other human rights violations committed against Croatian and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
123  The court upheld the action against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under the principles of Filartiga, finding with respect to the “state action” requirement that
the plaintiffs had adequately alleged Karadzic to be acting either on behalf of an embryonic
“state” or  “in concert” with Serbia (i.e., the former Yugoslavia).
124  The court noted also in dicta
that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously upheld claims against private individuals under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.
125  Pirates, slave traders, or other types of “hostis humani generis (an
enemy of all mankind)” have been held accountable for violations of international legal norms.
126
Doe v. Unocal Corporation
127 provides an example of how extraterritorial liability for
violations of international law may eventually apply to business corporations.  In Unocal, the
                                                
119  Id. at 878.
120  70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
121  Id. at 236.
122  Id. at 237.
123  Id. at 236.  The allegations included “various atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, forced
prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as
part of a genocidal campaign.”  Karadzic was alleged to have “ultimate command authority” over these military
forces.  Id.
124  Id. at 244-45.
125  Id. at 239 (citing early cases against piracy).
126  Id. at 239 (quoting In The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 213 (1844).  See also Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (arguing that individual
liability was available under the Alien Tort Claims Act for some acts including piracy and slave trading).  Pirates and
their ilk, of course, are as old as human civilization.  See, e.g., THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. I 37
(Rex Warner trans., Penguin ed. 1972) (recounting that Minos was “the first person to organize a navy” to combat
“piracy,” which had become “a common profession” in ancient Greece).
127  110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
24
company and its officials were sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of human
rights in a joint venture with a French oil company, Total N.A., in Myanmar (Burma).
128  The
court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the official “state action”
requirement of the Alien Tort Claims Act had not been met.
129  But the facts of the case suggest a
close call.  The U.S. State Department had warned Unocal (and Total) of forced labor (otherwise
known as slavery) by Myanmar, and the Myanmar army, which agreed to undertake a “security”
role in the gas pipeline project, had a history of violations of human rights.
130  One of Unocal’s
own consultants had written a letter warning that
My conclusion is that egregious human rights violations have occurred, and are occurring
now, in southern Burma. The most common are forced relocation without compensation
of families from land near/along the pipeline route; forced labor to work on infrastructure
projects supporting the pipeline ([euphemistically called] government services in lieu of
payment of taxes); and imprisonment and/or execution by the army of those opposing
such actions.  Unocal, by seeming to have accepted [the Myanmar army’s] version of
events, appears at best naive and at worst a willing partner in the situation.
131
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace confronted Unocal executives
about its complicity in the project and were ignored.
132  In the end, the district court granted
summary judgment under a strict reading of the “state action” requirement of the Alien Tort
Claims Act and concluded that the plaintiffs had presented “no evidence that Unocal participated
                                                
128 Id. at 1295.  In a separated proceeding, Total was dismissed from the action on grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction.  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
129  110 F. Supp.2d at 1304-10.  In its legal analysis, the court drew on questionable comparisons to the
“state action” requirements in federal civil rights cases.  Id. at 1305-07.  The court does not explain why “state
action” in the context of international violations of human rights should be compared with “state action”
requirements in the enforcement on national civil rights.  The “states” in question are quite different.
130  Id. at 1296-98, 1302.  Unocal’s CEO admitted understanding that the Myanmar army would “provide
general security” for the project, but denied any knowledge of “any contract” to this effect. Id. at 1301.
131  Id. at 1299-1301.  Unocal’s counsel even argued that the forced “government services in lieu of
payment of taxes” could be justified under a post-Civil War precedent that upheld a state’s requirement “to work on
roads and bridges for ten hours a day for six days per year or pay $3 [in tax].”  Id. at 1308 (citing Butler v. Perry,
240 U.S. 328 (1916).  The court rightly rejected this argument as “hardly analogous.”  Id. 
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in or influenced’ the military’s unlawful conduct.”
133  No evidence revealed an explicit contract,
agreement, or “conspiracy” between Unocal and the Myanmar government to violate human
rights through forced labor and relocation.
134  However, in reaching its result, the court discussed
the Nazi-era Nuremberg cases against the wartime German industrialists to apply the relevant
international legal principles.
135  At least, it appears that the Unocal executives stepped over the
moral if not the legal edge of acceptable behavior in knowing about and benefitting from human
rights violations in the pursuit of its economic objectives.  The holding of Doe v. Unocal is also
arguably in tension with the Second Circuit’s recognition of the potential liability of private
citizens without a state action requirement in Kadic v. Karadzic.
136  Business corporations in the
future would be well-advised legally as well as ethically to steer clear of business relationships
with governments or its military forces that operate outside the pale of international recognition
and acceptability.
137  Although Doe v. Unocal Corp. may be narrowly interpreted as a corporate
victory against human rights claims, few business corporations would wish to have to rely on
Nazi-era precedents and good lawyering to win summary judgment in similar circumstances.  If
the case reached a jury, the outcome would most likely be unpleasant for shareholders as well as
corporate executives. 
                                                
133  Id. at 1306.
134  Id. at 1306-10.
135  Id. at 1310.  Three cases at Nuremberg involved prosecutions of German industrialists for war crimes. 
Defendants convicted were two executives in the German steel industry, five executives of the I.G. Farben chemicals
company, and twelve member of the Krupp corporation.  Id. t 1309-11 (citing Nuremberg cases).
136  See supra note __ and accompanying text (noting private liability of hostis humani generis for human
rights violations under international law).
137  For further discussion of the Unocal case and its implications, see Craig Forcese, Note, ATCA's Achilles
Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487 (2001); Pia
Zara Thadhani, Note, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses:  Is Unocal The Answer?, 42 WM & MARY L.
REV. 619 (2000); Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why Unocal Should be Liable Under U.S. Law for
Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35 (1998).  For further general discussion and
recommendations, see also David I. Becker, Note, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 183 (1998); Gregory G.A. Tzeutschle, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 359 (1999).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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C.  Ethical Constraints on the War Business
Even if Unocal’s dealings with the Myanmar army did not rise to the level of a violation
of international human rights as a legal matter, it also illustrates that basic moral understandings
should constrain corporate conduct.
138  It is difficult to see how Unocal can morally justify its
actions in Myanmar given repeated warnings from government officials and nongovernmental
organizations of persistent practices of slave labor, forced relocations, and other human rights
violations.  Unocal’s complicity may not quite reach the moral baseness of actively cooperating
with Nazis, but the company’s actions come close.  Moral shame and blame should therefore
accrue.
139
If the pipeline in Myanmar were not enough, the Unocal Corporation also provides
another lesson in how to choose the wrong business partner when it negotiated an arrangement
with the Taliban in Afghanistan to help protect construction of a planned oil pipeline across the
country in the 1990s.  This deal, fortunately for the company, was abandoned by 1999, perhaps in
part as a result from political pressure from feminist groups, but more likely as a consequence of
the rising infamy of Osama bin Laden.
140  Few, if any, corporations can maintain that it is ethical
to make deals with terrorists.  Like pirates or Nazis, international terrorists belong to the category
of hostis humani generis.
141  If doing business with terrorists is not a violation of international
law, it arguably should be.
                                                
138  A similar analysis may apply to the French company, Total, as well.
139  Cf. DRINAN, supra note __.  Cf. also David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001) (discussing the importance of shaming in corporate governance, but with different ends in view).
140  See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 170-75
(2000).  But cf. Milton Bearden, Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov.-Dec. 2001), at 17, 26
(recognizing the U.S. firms had abandoned hopes of building an Afghanistan pipeline with Taliban support by 1997).
 
141  See supra note __ and accompanying text.  For the controversial argument that IBM knowingly stepped
over the moral line in its business dealings with Nazi Germany, see EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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In addition to following the law, both Milton Friedman and the Principles of Corporate
Governance recognize ethical constraints on business beyond formal legal requirements.
142 
Ethical business practices do not begin and end with the law.  Again as Melvin Eisenberg writes,
Section 2.01's discussions of “ethical considerations” express a common sense understanding
about corporate governance:  “We don’t want a society in which people are encouraged to
become amoral when they become corporate executives.  We don’t want a society in which
managers check their ethics at the door.”
143
                                                
142  Again, Friedman and the ALI do not use similar terms.  See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
Friedman’s reference to “ethical custom” is much more general than the ALI’s discussion of various ethical
qualifications.
143  Eisenberg, supra note __, at 5.
Another example from an illustration in the Principles of Corporate Governance and
adapted further by Eisenberg in a recent article should be sufficient to prove the general point
that compulsory moral obligations should sometimes constrain a corporate action even when it is
not technically illegal.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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Corporation D is a large publicly held corporation engaged in the manufacture of
powerful computers, with annual earnings of $ 60-70 million.  D has been negotiating
with a North African country for the sale of three computers.  Negotiations were
essentially complete, and a contract ready to sign, when the State Department announced
that within the next few days the President would adopt an executive order prohibiting 
the shipment of certain high-technology products to that country, because its conduct was
highly inimical to the United States and threatened the stability of the entire area.  In other
words, the State Department was going to add the country to a list of states that sponsored
international terrorism.  The State Department announced, however, that the formal legal
prohibition would not be applied to contracts made before the order became effective, but
urged voluntary compliance as of the date of the announcement.  It was clear that when
the executive order became effective it would apply to D’s computers.  D estimates that
the sale would generate earnings of $6 million, and that short- and long-term costs
entailed by completing the sale would not be significant.  D nevertheless decides not to
sign the contract, because its officials believe that sale of the computers would contravene
a strong and clearly announced national policy.  D’s action is not only proper but ethically
compelled.
144
I have changed the facts slightly – adding the ethical “hot button” of a State Department listing of
the North African country as a state sponsor of international terrorism.  But this change is only
designed to make moral point of the revised outcome more convincing.  Although the American
Law Institute’s commentary suggests that D might be allowed to sign such a contract under the
principle of following its economic objective,
145 it does not require much argument to convince
most managers that entering such a contract would be unethical and, indeed, morally prohibited.
This example also provides an illustration of how Section 2.01 of the ALI’s Principles of
Corporate Governance does not exhaust the analysis required of corporate managers, especially
high-level executives.  Section 2.01 recognizes “ethical obligations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business,”
146 which echoes Milton Friedman’s
allowance for “ethical custom.”
147  But notice the circularity in both of these formulations. 
                                                
144  Adapted from Eisenberg, supra note __, at 7-8, adapted in turn from AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra
note __, § 2.01, illus. 21, at 69.
145  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __, § 2.01, illus. 22, at 69.
146  See supra note __ and accompanying text.
147  See supra note __ and accompanying text.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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Someone must make the ethical decisions that eventually become “reasonably regarded” by the
business community as “ethical customs.”  The example of Corporation D’s computer sales to a
country that knowingly “harbors terrorists,” as well as many other real-world cases such as
Unocal’s investment in Burma, indicate that much moral ground remains to be tilled to determine
the appropriate ethical conduct in transnational business.  Answers to tough moral business
problems cannot rely solely on the experience of previous generations or entrenched customs. 
Previous moral answers themselves have sources in basic principles and reasoning, and new
moral situations require fresh reasoning if not new principles to resolve.  “Following the crowd”
is not an acceptable ethical strategy.
D.  Permissive Business Ethics and War
The third and last exception to the economic objective provided in Section 2.01 permits
corporations to “devote a reasonable amount of resources [that is, donate] to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”
148  This exception is recognized in so-
called charitable contribution statutes in almost all states.
149  Commentators have added the
limitation of “reasonableness,” presumably to curtail corporations from acting too lovingly,
especially when the love for some is expressed by giving away other people’s money.
150
Again, Eisenberg gives a good example of the permissive ethical exception relevant to
present circumstances.
[S]uppose America is at war.  C Corporation devotes corporate resources for the purpose
of furthering the war effort, rather than for maximizing the profits on the commodities it
                                                
148  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __,  § 2.01(b)(3).
149  Id. Reporter’s Note at 72.
150   Id.  See also Prunty, supra note __.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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produces and then sells – for example, by holding down prices to prevent inflation.
151
Eisenberg argues that corporate behavior supporting the war effort may have a rational economic
justification if “it is in the economic interest of all American corporations that America should
win the war.”
152  Then, business corporations would face a collective action problem – or
prisoner’s dilemma – but if they coordinated their actions and “all devoted resources to the war
effort, they would all be better off.”
153
This argument is correct, as far as it goes.  But notice that some complications that arise
on closer examination of Eisenberg’s example.  The economic interests of different corporations
may quickly diverge in a war economy.  Different corporations may thus have different economic
interests in going along with a collective effort to support a war.  In other words, collective action
problems arise for the political effectiveness of moral exhortations to sacrifice profits for war.
154
More importantly, Eisenberg’s example of C Corporation provides an illustration of the
permissive ethical principle.  For a just war, a business corporation may provide a “reasonable”
amount of support.  Lockheed Martin, for example, again provides a contemporary example in
having setting up a “American Spirit Fund” initially supported with a corporate donation of $1
million in the wake of the September 11 attack.
155  Such permissive ethical behavior is within the
standard ethical understanding of the nature and purposes of the corporation.  Indeed, many state
statutes explicitly authorize corporations to depart from the economic objective for the purposes
of contributing resources to the public welfare “in time of war or other national emergency.”
156
                                                
151  Eisenberg, supra note __, at 12.
152  Id.
153  Id.
154  For discussion of these limitations, see WALTZ, supra note __, at 193-96 & n.11.
155  See supra note __ [giving website].
156  See DELAWARE GENERAL CORP. LAW § 122 [add date] ( corporations “shall have the power to . . . make
donation in the public welfare . . . and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof. . . .”); NEW YORK William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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The clear moral issues presented by the prospect of participating in war helps to clarify
the moral issues faced by business corporations in Section 2.01.  Following the incisive analysis
of Donald Schwartz, one should distinguish between (a) ethical constraints that are arguably
imposed by Section 2.01's admonition that corporate managers “may take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business”
and (b) permissive ethical behavior that allows for a corporation affirmatively to contribute “a
reasonable amount of resources” to charities, education, public welfare, or other philanthropic or
humanitarian causes.
157  Although both ethical constraints and ethical permissions are exceptions
to the profit-making economic objective relate to moral principles, the distinction between them
makes sense in terms of the gravity of different kinds of ethical decisions.
In many situations, moral philosophers argue that it is worse to commit a serious wrong
than to avoid doing a good act.  To put the idea in philosophical terms:  Other things being equal,
directly causing harm is very often worse than allowing harm to occur.
158  A common example
discussed in philosophy is the difference between “killing and letting die.”
159  Both are bad, but
intentional killing is usually thought to be worse than various inactions that could have saved
lives.
160  Murder, for example, is morally worse than failing to give a donation that may save the
lives of starving people in Afghanistan.  In the context of war and corporate governance, then, it
                                                                                                                                                            
BUSINESS CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) [add date] (corporations  have the power “to make donations, irrespective of
corporate benefit, for the public welfare . . . and in time or war or other national emergency in aid thereof. . . .”).  In
addition, corporate constituency statutes in Florida, Ohio, and other states include “the economy of the state and
nation” as among the various interests that corporate directors and managers may consider in making business
decisions.  E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.59(E)(2).
157  See supra note __ and accompanying text.
158   See, e.g., WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION __ (1993) [complete cite].
159  For a recent collection of essays on the topic, see KILLING AND LETTING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock &
Alastair Norcross, 2d ed., 1994).
160  The distinction between killing and letting die is often considered a specific instance of a more general
distinction between doing and allowing.  Alistrair Norcross, Introduction, KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note __,
at 9.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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seems worse to contribute weapons of war to a tyrannical regime that result in the unjustified
deaths of many people than to fail to make charitable contributions to good cause in society
(including the cause of a just war or good government).  The philosophical complications in this
area are considerable and require references to specific situations to work out correctly, but for
the purposes here it is enough to show that Section 2.01's division between what might be though
of as ethical duties – and permissions – may make substantive philosophical sense.  The world is
morally complicated (as well as complicated in many other ways).  Therefore, it makes sense to
identify clear moral constraints as opposed to moral permissions.  The former, of course, should
be taken much more seriously when a person (or corporation) faces a choice of action.
161
Still, one worries about the fact that Section 2.01 refers to moral constraints themselves
only as “permissive.”
162  One might interpret this provision to allow for quite evil corporate acts
as long as they are legal.  Only a cursory reflection on the problems of war crimes, genocide, and
other major human rights violations discussed above, should be sufficient to dispel this notion. 
Probably, Section 2.01 should recognize that at least some moral requirements are imperative,
not merely “permissive” or “voluntary.”  The ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance err on
the side of caution by avoiding a straightforward statement that corporations must adhere to
                                                
161  The distinction between moral constraints and permissions does not correspond with a further subset of
ethically “superogatory” behavior.  This term is used to refer to unusually good or heroic behavior of a kind that
most people cannot be expected to perform.  Very brave acts for good ends in the face of grave risks of death, for
example, are praised but not expected as a rule.  In the terms employed here, a corporation could act in a
“superogatory” fashion in promoting, for example, a peaceful world above and beyond the expectations of the
public.  But this would be a kind of permissive ethical behavior; other permissive ethical behavior may be expected –
such as some form or amount of corporate charitable contribution – that is not superogatory.
162  The ALI’s official comment goes so far as to state explicitly that “Section 2.01(b)(2) does not impose a
legal obligation to take ethical considerations into account.”  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __, § 2.01 cmt.
h at 64.  It goes on to say that “the absence of a legal obligation . . . does not mean that corporate decisionmakers are
not subject to the same ethical obligations of other members of society.” Id.  But this double-negative construction
does not make the statement in favor of corporate ethical obligations very strong.  Moreover, in some cases,
particular when the support of wars may be involved, corporations may in fact have greater responsibilities than
ordinary citizens in making ethical decisions whether or not to support given military activities, given the likelihood
of their decisions having a larger social impact.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
33
ethical as well as legal constraints.  But this strategy is dangerous given that some business
corporations inevitably face great ethical responsibilities that bear in matters of war and peace. 
At least, corporate lawyers (and legal and business academics) should make clear that following
the law – or even following the crowd – does not permit a corporation to transgress foundational
moral boundaries.
III.  War and Economics:  Toward the Institution of Peace?
Even the most hard-bitten law-and-economist must admit when pressed that stark moral
choices posed by war should constrain business enterprises.  In modern societies, a business
corporation may have a primary objective of  “enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain,”
but this objective is grounded on an implicit assumption of relative peace.  In other words, the
profit-seeking objective of a business corporation must find its limits in the political will of
democratic states as expressed in positive law.  When the peaceful legal framework is shattered
by war, then even the limits of law are insufficient.  Doing business with pirates, slave traders, or
terrorists cannot be morally justified, even if international law cannot yet reach these wrongs. 
Conspiring or cooperating with Nazis or Al Qaeda cannot be morally condoned.
Even though nothing is said of the values and principles of political democracy in the
Principles of Corporate Governance, these values and principles are implicit in the exception to
the “economic objective” given by the “boundaries set by law.”
163  The “ethical considerations”
mentioned generally by the American Law Institute are also essential to determining the actions
that business corporations may and should take when faced with situations of war or situations
that are likely to involve fighting wars.  These are principles that should find international scope
and application.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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Corporate decisions to participate in and profit from war – even for a just cause – carry
moral as well as legal responsibility.  In commenting on U.S. military participation in the war
against Serbia on behalf of Kosovo, an American law professor perceptively observed:  “As I
read the national pulse, what Americans don’t want is for their children to be sent into harm’s
way to guarantee higher profits for corporations. . ..”
164  Wars and corporate participation in wars
must have a higher moral and political justification than profit and shareholder gain.
The larger justifications for war include basic moral and political principles of freedom,
democracy, and peace.  I will not attempt here to argue for which of these higher principles may
be necessary or sufficient to justify violent conflict and intentional killing.
165  Contemplation of
the truth of modern war – and the participation of business corporations in it – should convince
even the most economically-oriented legal theorists that some higher moral values must play a
significant role in contemporary corporate law and governance – at  least when matters of war
and peace are at stake.  Business corporations, as well as nation-states and individual citizens,
cannot avoid confronting important moral issues of responsibility when they participate actively
in war.
Finally, to conclude on a more positive note, the institutions of business – including
business corporations and the competition of organized markets – may contribute to a social
psychological solution to the long-standing problem of war in human society.  On one hand,
modern business corporations supply the means of modern war.  They may profit from war, and
                                                                                                                                                            
163  See supra note __ and accompanying text [quoting ALI text].
164  Robert F. Turner, Kosovo:  Legal and Policy Implications, 10 U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD.
67, 85 (1999/2000).
165  For leading treatments of the political and ethical problems of war, see WALTZ, supra note __; MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).  For a  more recent discussion, agreeing with Walzer that even just wars
must be fought with ethical restraint, see WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION: NORMS AND FORCE IN
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this fact raises a very difficult political issue of isolating the business interests of “the military
industrial complex” from political decision making about war and peace.
166  On the other hand,
business competition may also provide what William James called “the moral equivalent of war”
needed for the permanent institution of peace.
167  “History is a bath of blood,” observes James.
168
 Today – after two world wars have been fought since James wrote his famous essay – some still
say “peace” when they mean “war expected” or even “permanent, unceasing” war.
169   Building a
global civilization that includes competitive business enterprises and economic markets may,
perhaps, point the direction toward a “substitute for war’s disciplinary function,” as well as its
psychological and even aesthetic attractiveness to human beings.
170   By taming the business
corporation, we might also tame ourselves.
William James also observed that “war-making is due to definite motives and subject to
prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, such like any other form of enterprise.”
171  Business
corporations have been instruments of war, but they can also serve the cause of “the institution of
peace.”
172  In a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world, there is a strong argument for
“an intellectual duty to proclaim the inconceivability of war.”
173  To do so, however, does not
itself advance the practical conditions of peace.
174  Building institutions of peace will require,
                                                
166  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, Jan. 17, 1961,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1038 (1961) [check cite].
167  William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, in BEST AMERICAN ESSAYS OF THE CENTURY 45 (Joyce
Carol Oates ed. 2000) (1910).
168  Id. at 46.
169  Id. at 47.  Even Plato said that “peace” was only another name for “incessant” war.  PLATO, LAWS,
1.626A (quoted in VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN
POWER 440 (2001)).
170  James, supra note __ at 51.
171  Id. at 52.
172  Cf. MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(2001).
173  UMBERTO ECO, FIVE MORAL PIECES 16 (2001).
174  For a strong practical argument along these lines, see WALTZ, supra note __, at ___ [complete cite].William Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
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again in the words of James, a “a future when acts of war shall be outlawed as between civilized
peoples.”
175 New and improved structures of international law, including “institutionalized
restraints and institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests,” will be required.
176  
This future civilization, however, will also need large business corporations not only to perform
an economic objective, but also to abide by the law and to act ethically.  Then, perhaps we can
hope to establish at least improved probabilities for “a reign of peace.”
177
Conclusion
Sadly and tragically, peace will not come without the collective monopolization of force
that makes war possible.  The threat of new enemies, including international terrorists, “requires
that the responsible powers, committed to . . . peace,  must be able to deploy forces of the highest
quality, human as well as technological, to any part of the globe at all times.”
178  Clausewitz
writes memorably that
If bloody slaughter is a horrible spectacle, then it should only be a reason for treating war
with more respect, but not for making the sword we bear blunter and blunter by degrees
from feelings of humanity, until once again someone steps in with a sword that is sharp
and hews away the arms from our bodies.
179
Business corporations therefore have an essential role to play in the enterprise of peace, even as
they contribute to the modern armories of war, but they – and the social and political institutions
that regulate them – must take their responsibilities seriously and with the proper ethical gravity.
 War is not merely a game for business to play for profits.  If war is a game, it is a very serious
one that requires ethics and legal regulation as well as economics.
                                                
175  James, supra note __, at 52-53.
176  WALTZ, supra note __, at 231.
177  James, supra note __, at __.  As Waltz argues, it may ask too much to hope for a true and everlasting
peace on earth.  But we might at least in improve the odds by “decreasing the incidence of war” and “increasing the
chances of peace.”  WALTZ, supra note __, at 1.
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In this article, I have not provided many practical answers to the question of how business
corporations can be better regulated or how business executives can make better moral decisions
with respect to war.  But I hope at least to have raised these issues as serious ones deserves of
academic and practical attention.  Useful future research may include the following list of topics:
•   What current national and international regulations constrain corporate profit-
making in supply the goods and services of war?  How can national laws such as
the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act be improved or
supplemented?  What lessons may be learned from other countries?  What would
a comparative study of these laws recommend in terms of possible international
regulation in this area?
•   Should special laws constrain the participation of military-related businesses in
political lobbying and campaign financing?  If so, how?
                                                                                                                                                            
179  WALTZ, supra note __, at 221 (quoting Clausewitz).
•   How should the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Prevention Act be
interpreted or amended with respect to claims against business corporations, as
well as individuals, by victims of human rights violations?  How would such
interpretations or amendments either promote peace or be counterproductive to
this end?
•   Should the novel and growing form of “private military companies” that appear to
be in the thriving business of providing mercenary military services be regulated
at the international level?  If so, how?  Are there benefits to private military
companies in a world in which the relative power of nation-states is declining?
•   How should the law of corporate governance – both national and international –
be changed to reflect a realistic and humane conception of the important of
business corporations in matters of war and peace, as well as the promotion of
economic well-being?  How can corporate executives be given the flexibility to
act ethically on these issues, without giving them the latitude to abuse their power
and authority?
•   What are the current best practices of corporations in the defense industry in terms
of ethical and legal compliance programs?  How can ethical and legal behavior in
the defense industry be encouraged both nationally and internationally?
•   What kinds of ethical issues do different companies in different businesses relatedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 427
38
to warfare face?  What does the emerging discipline of business ethics offer in
terms of rational approaches to solving these ethical dilemmas?
•   How can business corporations act permissibly, within their legal power, to
promote global peace as well as prosperity?  How could superogatory or heroic
corporate actions in promoting peace be recognized or rewarded?DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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